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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
The burden is upon the insured to establish that their claim for relief is
authorized by the terms of the policy.'> Since the insured did not properly allege
the necessary degree of tort liability, to establish a prima facie claim for breach
of the policy contract, his motion for summary judgment on the pleadings, must
fail for insufficiency.
Insured further contended that insurer is estopped from denying liability
under the policy because they undertook the defense of a prior action to
determine insured's tort liability under the original claim for damages.17 The
Court rejected this assertion by pointing out that the insurer had in fact given
notice of its intention to reserve claim before defending the action and was
therefore not estopped.'8
The Court had thus probed deeply into the facts surrounding a motion for
summary judgment on the pleadings. Although summary judgment is an
efficient, expedient measure to quickly eliminate ungrounded controversies from
today's overcrowded court calendars, it must be used with utmost care and
discretion. If this caution is not observed, we will open wide the dangerous door
to denial of due process, in the guise of judicial expediency.
Summary Judgment-Determnation Of The Nature Of The Action
In Erbe. v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Company,19 the plaintiffs brought an
action against the executor-trustee of a trust which had been concluded nine
years before, alleging certain wrongful acts of self-dealing which had taken place
more than ten years before this action. The plaintiffs had unsuccessfully alleged
bad faith on the part of the defendant in prior proceedings relating to the
termination of the trust but brought the present action alleging newly discovered
evidence of fraud, apparently resulting from a perusal of the Surrogate's Court
records pertaining to the trust.
The complaint was dismissed in Special Term2 0 on the grounds that the
action, though for damages in fraud, was precluded by the six year statute of
limitations2 ' since the plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of the events at the
16. Lavine v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 260 N.Y. 339, 183
N.E. 897 (1933).
17. Moore Construction Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 293
N.Y. 119, 56 N.E.2d 74 (1944); Gerka v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,
251 N.Y. 51, 57, 167 N.E.169, 170 (1929).
18. Moore Construction Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. 293
N.Y. 119, 125, 56 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1944); Knauss Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America, 270 N.Y. 211, 215, 216, 200 N.E. 791-93 (1936).
19. 3 N.Y.2d 321, 165 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1957).
20." 1 Misc.2d 413, 145 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
21. N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT §48 (5).
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time they occurred to infer the allegations made in this complaint. The Appellate
Division2 2 sustained the dismissal, but on the grounds that the gravamen of the
complaint was constructive fraud and therefore barred by the ten year statute.
23
Finally, the Court of Appeals2 4 reversed, holding the action to be one in actual
fraud, but stating that the record failed to show a sufficient basis for imputing
knowledge of fraud before the time alleged.
Since a complaint asking for relief barred by the lapse of time will not
preclude inconsistent relief, the barred application for relief being a mere nullity,
25
it seems clear that the Appellate Division incorrectly excluded consideration of the
cause of action in extrinsic fraud. And as to the knowledge necessary to commence
the running of the statute of limitations for fraud, the facts known must be such
that the plaintiff ought to have known of the fraud, or of such possibility of
fraud, that a prudent person would investigate.20 This, of course, is a question of
fact. Since the record indicated concealment on the part of the defendants, the
Court of Appeals justifiably postponed further determination of the truth of these
allegations until trial.
Release-Existence Of Cause Of Action
Where a cause of action exists at the time a general release of liability is
given, but has not ripened into litigation, is it proper to give summary judgment
for a defendant who pleads the release as a bar to the action, or is the question of
whether such a cause of action was actually in dispute between the parties at the
time of the settlement one to be determined on trial?
In Lucio v. Curran,27 the Court held that summary judgment was proper,
affirming the decision of the Appellate Division,2 8 which had reversed the denial
of the defendant's motion for summary judgment by the Supreme Court at
Special Term.
29
Plaintiff's expulsion from the National Maritime Union in 1949 was upheld
by the union's national convention the same year. In 1950 he sued the treasurer of
the union in Municipal Court of New York City for wages plus vacation and
severance pay, in the total amount of $495.00. While the case was pending, plain.
tiff offered to deliver a release limited to the pending Municipal Court action in
return for a proposed settlement. Defendant demanded and received in February
22. 2 A.D.2d 242, 154 N.Y.S.2d 179 (4th Dep't 1956).
23. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §53.
24. See note 19 supra.
25. Schenk v. State Line Telephone Co., 238 N.Y. 308, 144 N.E. 592 (1924).
26. Higgins v. Crouse, 147 N.Y. 411, 42 N.E. 6 (1895).
27. 2 N.Y.2d 157, 157 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1956).
28. 284 App.Div. 1039, 135 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1st Dep't 1954).
29. 122 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
